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NOTES
THE USE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS AGAINST NATIONS THAT VIOLATE
HUMAN RIGHTS: CAN THE UNITED STATES FORCE
REFORM ON SOUTH AFRICA?
"There comes a time in the life of a country when it must
live up to the principles that made that country special and different in the world and in history."1 Inspired by the notion that
Americans are the vanguards of equality and justice in the free
world, human rights considerations have become a major tenet
of United States foreign policy.' Increasingly, decision makers
recognize an obligation to seek redress for human rights violations in areas where United States influence can be asserted.'
Enthusiasm, however, for a human rights based approach to the
1.
2.

131 CONG. REC. S11053 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1985) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
Vogelgesang, What Price Principle? U.S. Policy On Human Rights, 56 FOREIGN
AFF. 819 (1978). For a discussion of the role of human rights in U.S. foreign policy see
generally, P. BROWN & D. MACLEAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1979); D.
FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1982).
3. Vogelgesang discusses using "leverage" on U.S. aid recipients in order to develop a
foreign policy that would "make Americans feel proud again." Volgelgesang, supra note

2, at 821-826. See also,

KIRKPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY,
RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1 (1982). Kirkpatrick asserts:

in

HUMAN

An adequate human rights policy will also have a realistic conception of the relationships among force, freedom, morality, and power because history teaches us
too that in the real world force may be necessary to reinforce freedom; and
American power is necessary to protect and expand the frontiers of freedom in
our time.

Id. at 11. But cf.,

GREENBERG, IN ORDER TO SAVE IT, WE HAD TO DESTROY

ON THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS,

in

IT. REFLECTIONS

HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERI-

FOREIGN POLICY 39 (1982). Greenberg contends:
It is my view that the active involvement of the United States in the support,
promotion, and protection of regimes which are consistent violators of human
rights is neither accidental nor random but is derived from the inherent requirements of the American political economy. The enjoyment of rights at home has
historically depended upon the destruction of the rights of others abroad and
that relationship holds to the present day. American freedoms are built upon an
elaborate structure of overseas repression with which we are both directly and
indirectly involved.
Id. at 41.
CAN

HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL

[Vol. IV

conduct of foreign policy must be tempered by three realizations. First, most nations consider foreign criticism of their performance on human rights an unacceptable assault on their sovereignty." Second, stress on human rights must at all times be
weighed against other significant, and often paramount, policy
considerations.8 And third, one must answer the perennial questions of: "Whose morality and at what cost to whom?" '6 Consequently, a formulation of foreign policy which recognizes human
rights considerations ultimately revolves around the determina'7
tion of "What Price Principle?"

Perhaps nowhere is this human rights approach and its
counterveiling policy considerations more evident than in U.S.
relations with the Republic of South Africa. South Africa is governed under a principle of apartheid which is a comprehensive
and systematic pattern of racial discrimination, containing identifiable components of both slavery and caste, which is prescribed and enforced by national law.8 In the United States
4.

Vogelgesang, supra note 2, at 827. See generally, R. FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
(1982).
5. Vogelgesang, supra note 2, at 828. See also, FAIRBANKS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 87 (1982). Fairbanks
maintains:
Moreover, since human rights is a goal additional to the national interest, pursuing such a policy would seem inevitably to involve sacrificing the national interest in one way or another. A human rights policy can put the national interest at
risk by creating unnecessary enmities with states that have different conceptions
of human rights.
Id.
6. Vogelgesang, supra note 2, at 819.
7. Id. at 841. In short, there is no set answer to the question of "What Price Principle?" Human rights goals must be weighed along with a myriad of other foreign policy
considerations, in a case-by-case approach, to establish a realistic foreign policy. Ultimately, this weighing of interests dictates that the cost of pursuing a policy based on
"principle" must not outweigh its potential benefits. Nevertheless, even with the vulnerability of human rights goals to this analysis, Vogelgesang asserts that "Promotion of
human rights may therefore be more significant for the questions it raises than the answers it gives." Id.
STATE SOVERIGNTY

8. McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 521

(1980). See also, South African Institute of Race Relations, What Is Apartheid? (Aug.
31, 1985) (obtainable from the South African Institute of Race Relations' Publications
Department, P.O. Box 97, Johannesburg, 2000 South Africa).
The term "apartheid" literally means apartness. This refers not only to racial
segregation in the social sphere, but also with regard to land ownership, freedom
of movement, citizenship rights, and the constitutional structure of South Africa.
Apartheid has two major aims: to seperate the races, and to maintain white po-
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there is an overwhelming "breadth of American revulsion" at the
practice of apartheid.9 Virtually everyone believes that apartheid
is evil;"0 it requires no special study or complex analysis."
Apartheid challenges one of the most fundamental principles of
American society: that all people are created equal and that they
are endowed with certain inalienable rights.' Thus, the crux of
the debate over U.S. policy towards South Africa is not one of
ends, but of means.' 3 How best can the U.S. promote reforms
that recognize the fundamental rights of the black majority?
The U.S. must formulate policy in such a manner that South
Africa's sovereignty is not threatened and vital U.S. interests are
not undermined. In other words, the end must be achieved
through means that do not require too great a price.'
litical control.
Id. at 1. See also, V. CRAPANZANO, WAITING: THE WHITES OF SOUTH AFRICA (1986).
"Apartheid precludes any contact with the people of different races that might undermine the assumption of essential difference." Id. at 39. See also, J. LELYVELD, MOVE
YOUR SHADOW (1985). "The theoretical justification for Apartheid is essentially Jungian:
that each of South Africa's racial, ethnic, and linguistic groups has its own collective
unconscious that must not be disturbed." Id. at 45.
9.

Lewis, The Uncertain Right, N.Y. Times, Jan.6, 1986, at A17, col. 5.

10. 131 CONG. REC. E3867 (daily ed. Sept.4, 1985) (statement of Hon. Walter E.
Fauntroy).
11. Id.
12. 131 CONG. REC., supra note 1. See also, The Declaration of Independence (U.S.
1776).
13. See, MORRIS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN VIETNAM UNDER Two REGIMES: A CASE STUDY
WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

(1982).

In making important policy choices, the statesman often has to deal with two
distinct problems: the problem of choosing morally appropriate or just ends and
the problem of choosing the right means to realize those ends. Neither choice is
necessarily simple, though it is often the choice of means which poses the greatest moral complexity.

Id. at 137.
14. "There can and should be consistent determination to take human rights into
serious account for U.S. foreign policy. Yet, stress on human rights must at all times be
weighed against other factors." Vogelgesang, supra note 2, at 828. See also, Text of Re-

marks By The President To Members Of The World Affairs Council And The Foreign
Policy Association (July 22, 1986). President Reagan recognized the importance of the
means/end analysis when he stated: "But if we Americans are agreed upon the goal, a
free and multiracial South Africa associated with free nations and the West, there is
deep disagreement about how to reach it." Id. at 1.
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SOUTH AFRICA'S LAWS, POLICIES AND PEOPLE

A. Laws and Policies of Apartheid
A cost/benefit analysis through the means/end approach requires an understanding of the internal laws and policies of
South Africa. In South Africa, a person's political, civil, economic, and social rights hinge on membership in a racial group. 15
The central racial classification law, the Population Registration
Act of 1950, which is sometimes described as the cornerstone of
apartheid, orders the assignment of every person to one of three
groups: White, Coloured, or African.1 6
Such classifications, at least the racial and the ethnic
ones, describe one's essential being. They permit exquisitely mechanical stereotyping and promiscuous generalization; they prescribe an often terrifying social distance;
they provide the basis for apartheid understood in its
17
narrower legal sense.
In other words, "the single most important determinant of status and rights in South Africa remains the accident of birth."' 8
Currently, approximately 72 % of South Africans are classified as
black, 16% white, 9% coloured, and 3% Indian.' Armed with
this neat racial classification the government is free to legislate
rights as it pleases.
One of the more onerous legislative enactments is the Group
Areas Act of 1950. This Act provides for the creation of separate
group areas in towns and cities for each racial group.2 0 To further isolate and immobilize the African majority, the government has established Bantustans, or "homelands," which, under
the guise of producing regional representation, limit 80% of the
15.

Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa,

SOUTH AFRICA: TIME

RUNNING OUT 48 (1981) [hereinafter Policy Comm. Report].

16.

Id.

17. CRAPANZANO, supra note 8,at 19.
18. LELYVELD, supra note 8,at 86.
19. L. Louw & F. KENDALL, SOUTH AFRICA:

THE SOLUTION

167 (1986). These groupings

can be further broken down as follows: 21% Zulus, 19% Xhosa, 13% Sotho, 9% Tswana,
3% Tsonga, 2% Ndebele, 2 '. Swazi, 2% Venda, and 1% other, within the black grouping; and then 10% Afrikaan-speaking and 6% English-speaking within the white grouping. Id. at 168.
20. Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15 at 59.
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population to 13% of the country's territory.1 Currently, the
homelands accommodate 36% of the total South African population, or 52% of the black population.2 2 This attempt at ensuring separate development for the races has generally led to
wholesale poverty and corruption.2 3 To many South African
blacks, "The Bantustans are not intended to voice the aspirations of the African people; they are instruments for their subjugation. ' 24 Consequently:
These black states or parodies of black states are bound
to fail, bound to turn to the white government that created them. In their failure, they nicely confirm the white
man's fixed idea of "Africa" and teach blacks a lesson
about their fundamental irresponsibility and dependence;
the turning back confirms the white's fixed idea of
25
himself.
Perhaps the most degradating aspect of apartheid is ad-

vanced through the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of
1953.26 This Act, which legalized the concept that "separate and
unequal" treatment is acceptable, has given rise to the petty
apartheid rules which delineate segregation in the routine of
daily life. In rationalizing the application of this apparatus,
21. Woods, South Africa's Face To The World, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 521, 522 (1978). The
author also notes that the 87% happens to include the gold and diamond mines and all
the developed industrial and metropolitan areas and harbours. Id.
22. CRAPANZANO, supra note 8, at xviii.
23. Id. But cf. Homeland administrations insist that they are not puppets of South
Africa and are in fact independent. Interview with Minister Molatlhwa, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bophuthatswana, in Mbatho, Bophuthatswana (Sept. 11, 1986).
24. M. BENSON, NELSON MANDELA: THE MAN AND THE MOVEMENT 78 (1986).
25. LELYVELD, supra note 8, at 154.
26. The Reservation of Seperate Amenities Act remains the principle foundation of
segregation in public facilities. This act "allows any person in control of public premises
to reserve seperate and unequal facilities for different races and abolishes the powers of
the courts to nullify such actions." Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at 62.
27. Id. at 61-62. It is also interesting to note that the United States adhered to a
policy of "seperate but equal," Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), until it was
struck down as being unconstitutional, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74
S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). Some black Americans living in South Africa distinguish
the current South Africa crisis with the civil rights movement in the United States.
"South Africa's plight is not comparable to the civil rights movement in the U.S. beyond
the issue of race. The one similarity is black and white. . .[b]ut the complexities here,
we had nothing like that in the U.S." N.Y. Times, May 16, 1986, at A2, col. 3 (quoting
John Burroughs, U.S. Consul General in Cape Town). See generally, G. FREDRICKSON,
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State President P. W. Botha asserted that what some consider
discrimination they may deem legitimate "differentiation." ' 8 A
manifestation of this "differentiation" policy can be seen by analyzing the government expenditures on education. In terms of
per capita expenditures, in 1981-82 the government of South Africa spent roughly 1,221 rand on each White child, 798 rand on
each Coloured child, and 165 rand on each African child.29 This
inequity is one of the overriding sources of deep frustration and
discontent for South Africa's black youth. 0 "The nation's segregated black high schools have proved a crucible of unrest over
the last two years, with students boycotting classes and leading
the protest against white domination. ' '

Any African who violates one of the apartheid laws finds
himself subject to the Internal Security Act"2 and the Terrorism
Act.33 These Acts enable the Government to silence almost anyone who poses a challenge to the regime. " The Internal Security
Act empowers the minister of law and order to "ban anyone who
in his opinion engages in activities which endanger or are calculated to endanger the security of the state or the maintenance of
the public order."3 The Terrorism Act prohibits activity "likely
to endanger the maintenance of law and order [including] any
act causing embarassment to the administration of the affairs of
state."3 6 Both acts provide for detention without trial and expressly deny jurisdiction for review by the courts.
Irrespective of the vast array of statutes which permit the
government to maintain "law and order," it has become increasingly necessary for the government to enact new measures under
WHITE SUPREMACY:

A

COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN

AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY

(1981).
28. Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at 61.
29. CRAPANZANO, supra note 8, at 115. "Teacher-pupil ratios were 1:18 for Whites,
1:24 for Indians, 1:27 for Coloureds, and 1:43 for Blacks. Per capita expenditure is considerably lower and teacher-pupil ratios considerably higher in the homelands." Id., see
also, Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at 113.
30. Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at 112.
31. N.Y. Times, March 4, 1986, at Al, col. 3.
32. See, J. JACKSON, JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 42 (1980).
33. Id. at 37-38.
34. Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at 68.
35. JACKSON, supra note 32, at 42.
36. Id. at 37-38.
37. Id.
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a declaration of a state of emergency. 8 In June of 1986, State
President Botha reinstated the state of emergency which he had
ended only three months earlier. 9 "The new measures ban all
unauthorized political gatherings, give police sweeping powers to
make arrests and warrantless searches and detain people indefinitely without charge .. . .",o Government authorities state
that they have detained 8,500 people 30 days or more since June
12, 1986, but civil rights monitoring groups estimate the number
to be more than 15,000."' Nonetheless, it seems apparent that
"[h]eedless of overkill, the draftsmen have sought to arm the
multiple white bureaucracies with powers of control in just
about any circumstance in which blacks might seek to act of
their own volition in a white area."" 2 In effect, civil rights have
become privileges exercisable at the discretion of the
government.4 3
B. People
1) Black South Africans
The denial of basic civil rights which accompany the myriad
of security regulations only serves to exacerbate tensions and reduce the likelihood that peaceful solutions can be found. As tensions mount, moderate black leaders are either discredited and
replaced by those with more extreme views or the moderates
themselves become more extreme." For example, Archbishop,
and Nobel Peace Prize winner, Desmond Tutu has long been an
advocate of nonviolent protest." In the face of increasing criticism from the black community for the slow pace of nonviolent
38. See generally Southern Africa Project, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law, 1985 Annual Report, South Africa 1985: Martial Law in the Townships
(1986) (Available from the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 1400 Eye
Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005).
39. Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1986, at Al, col. 2.
40. Id. "While they are held under the emergency regulations, detainees are not allowed to see their lawyers or relatives and their names mat not be disclosed by the media." Wash. Post, July 3, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
41. N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1986, at Al, col. 2.

42.

LELYVELD,

43.
44.
45.

Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at 78.
Id. at 79.
The Argus, Sept. 8, 1986, at Al, col. 5.

supra note 8, at 88.
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reform,"' Archbishop Tutu has harshened his criticism of Western leaders 47 and recognized the efficacy of alternative means of
civil disobedience.48 Tutu's tenuous position has led some commentators to assert that "[hie has very little support or credibility among the black communities of this country," and that in
effect "Tutu's constituency is abroad."' 9
Another prominent moderate black leader is Mangosuthu
Buthelezi,50 the Chief of the Zulu tribe which is the largest single tribe in South Africa." Chief Buthelezi, a zealous advocate of
democracy and the free market system,52 steadfastly believes in
nonviolent reform and is committed to negotiating a power sharing agreement with the white government. 3 For his efforts,
many of the more radical blacks in South Africa regard Chief
Buthelezi as a collaborator with the white government."
Buthelezi is regarded by centrist whites and blacks as a
potential future president in a post-apartheid system.
But many other blacks resent the chief's willingness to do
business with the Botha government, viewing him as a
sellout and a puppet of apartheid who is holding back
their revolutionary struggle. 5
Perhaps the best known black in South Africa is the jailed
46. In Johannesburg "[a] crowd of 40,000 thousand blacks shouted angrily and booed
Desmond Tutu... after he told them that a meeting with the Government had produced
no concessions on their grievances." N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1986, at Al, col. 3.
47. In response to a recent speech by President Reagan, Desmond Tutu called the
speech "nauseating" and added that "the West, for my part, can go to hell." Richard
Stengel, Falling Short, TIME, Aug. 4, 1986, at 12.
48. In a speech in Atlanta Desmond Tutu stated that if no significant changes in
politics occurred soon "we start a campaign in our country of civil disobediance." N.Y.
Times, Jan. 20, 1986, at A16, col. 2.
49. The faces of Desmond Tutu, Financial Mail, Sept. 5, 1986, at 36. The author
contends that "By leading many to the belief that this country is on the brink of revolution, needing only the spark of sanctions to ignite it, he has done his cause, his flock and
his country great disservice." Id.
50. See generally M.G. BUTHELEZI, POWER IS OURS, SELECTED SPEECHES OF SOUTH AFRICAN STATESMAN M. GATSHA BUTHELEZI (1979).
51. See supra note 19.
52. Wash. Post, June 30, 1986, at A17, col. 1. See also David Brock & Peter
Younghusband, Zulu Chief's Apartheid Cure: Compromise and Capitalism, Insight,
Sept. 1, 1986, at 30. [hereinafter Brock].
53. Brock, supra note 52, at 31. See also, Bergen Record, Aug. 12, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
54. N.Y. Times, March 31, 1986, at Al, col. 5.
55. Brock, supra note 52, at 30.
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former African National Congress (ANC) leader Nelson
Mandela." In the 1940s and 50s Nelson Mandela was an advocate of nonviolent protest,57 but in the wake of continued government intransigence he hardened his attitudes.58 Arrested in
1962 for sabotage and plotting revolution, Nelson Mandela has
remained in prison since. 59 For most black South Africans, Nelson Mandela is seen as the embodiment of the Black Nationalist
Movement. 0 Recognizing the need to negotiate with Nelson
Mandela, the government has offered to release him on the condition he renounce violence. 1 This is a condition he is unwilling
to accept.62
For some in South Africa, a peaceful resolution is no longer
feasible. Following the Soweto uprising in 1976,6 a new generation of African and Coloured youth emerged with a new level of
defiance and fearlessness.64 For them, lurking beneath the surface of a relatively peaceful South Africa is a volcano of anger
56. See generally, Benson, supra note 24.
57. Benson quotes Mandela as saying in 1961:
The question being asked up and down the country is this: is it politically correct to continue preaching peace and nonviolence when dealing with a government whose barbaric practices have brought so much suffering and misery to
Africans?
Id. at 105.
58. Benson quotes Mandela: "If the government reaction is to crush by naked force
our non-violent struggle, we will have to reconsider our tactics. In my mind we are closing a chapter on this question of a non-violent policy." Id. at 104.
59. N.Y. Times, April 3, 1986, at A5, col. 1.
60. LELYVELD, supra note 8, at 329. See also, BENSON, supra note 24, at 13.
61. BENSON. supra note 24, at 234.
62. Id. at 235-239. Nelson Mandela has also denied a condition for his release that
required he live in exile. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1986, at All, col.1.
63. See generally,J. KANE-BERMAN, Sowgro: BLACK REVOLT, WHITE REACTION (1978).
The Soweto uprising occurred in June, 1976, when an estimated 30,000 schoolchildren
gathered to demonstrate against the government. A police contingent confronted the
crowd and when tear-gas failed to disperse them the police opened fire. According to
government figures, 176 people, many of them children, died in the riots. J. JOYCE, THE
NEW POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 116 (1978). This June black South Africans recognized
the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising. Quoting the Rev. David Nkwee, "it is a sad
occasion, but people also look up to it with pride. Because of June 16, 1976, South Africa
can never be the same." Wash. Post, June 16, 1986, at Al, col. 4.
64. Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at 169. "Radical high school students have
been at the forefront of the nation's violence and protest since 1984." N.Y. Times, Aug.
28, 1986, at Al, col. 1. These black youth see "themselves as the standard-bearers of a
revolution whose prospects are still ill-defined." N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1985, at A5, col. 1.
These youths, known as comrades, harshly enforce compliance with protest actions by
other township blacks. N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1986, at A4, col. 1.

178
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and discontent, and it is only a matter of time until the volcano
will erupt."5 The leaders of this faction, which have strong representation in the ANC, have an avowed goal of making South Africa "ungovernable."" Part of this effort, as stated by Oliver
Tambo, the head of the ANC, is to increase the killings of black
"collaborators" or those who try to work out peaceful solutions
with the government.6 7 Another aspect of ANC tactics has included increased attacks on civilian or "soft targets." ' For the
radical elements of South African society, like the ANC, the only
way to bring about change is through revolution and the only
acceptable change is black rule."'
65.

Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at 188.

66. 131 Cong. Rec. S10718 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985) (statement of Sen. Symms). For a
detailed analysis of the African National Congress see RSA Bureau of Information, Talking with the ANC. . . (June 1986) (Published by the Bureau of Information, Private Bag
X745, Pretoria 0001. Printed by Perskor Doornfontein, Johannesburg, on behalf of the
Government Printer, Pretoria).
According to Dr. DuPlessy of the South African Foreign Ministry: "There are no
nationalists in the ANC Executive Council, and the rank and file are generally misguided
and being used." Furthermore, "We do not know how the West can buy the ANC propaganda that they are a moderate nationalist movement. Every concept of their policy
objectives and strategy come directly from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."
Interview with Dr. DuPlessy, Assistant Foreign Minister of the Republic of South Africa,
in the Department of Forign Affairs, Pretoria, RSA (Sept. 2, 1986).
White, anti-government activist, Dr. Tom Lodge, states that "the ANC gets all its
weaponry from the Eastern bloc" and that "the ANC will eventually control South Africa." Interview with Dr. Tom Lodge, Senior Lecturer: Department of Political Studies,
University of Witwaterstrand, in Johannesburg, RSA (Sept. 12, 1986).
67. 131 Cong. Rec. supra note 66, at S10717. Black policemen have frequently been
the targets of attack by other blacks who accuse them of collaborating with white minority rule. N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1986, at A10, col. 1. Also, black leaders within the provincial or homeland councils have lost credibility among blacks because of their support for
the policy of homeland independence. Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at 191. "Incineration has become a favored form of execution among radical young blacks for those
they deem to be the stooges of white authority." N.Y. Times, March 4, 1986, at Al, col.
3.
68. The ANC has shown "a new readiness to step up its war against white minority
rule by attacking white civilians." N.Y. Times, Dec 24, 1986, at Al, col. 6. It seems the
ANC has adopted a policy of using "terrorist-style bomb attacks on civilian targets."
Wash. Post, July 8, 1986, at Al, col. 2.
69. Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at XX. The leader of the outlawed and
exiled ANC has called for a "rapid, extensive escalation" of his organization's war
against white rule and said civilians would die in the process. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1986,
at A7, col.2.
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2) White South Africans
To understand the political and social climate in South Africa it is necessary to understand the expectations and fears of
the white minority. "To be dominant in a system is not to dominate the system. Both the dominant and the dominated are
equally caught in it."7 0 The white minority which implements
the system is by no means a homogeneous group.71 Many recog-

nize that old answers will no longer do,7 but they disagree as to
the pace and extent that reform should be undertaken.7 3 For
many moderate whites fear of the future is pervasive 4 and they
look to God for the courage to change.7 5 Unfortunately, the moderate whites, which are primarily English-speaking, do not have
the impetus to evoke a lasting solution.7 1 "They criticize the

government, but they don't have any real solutions to our
77
problems. They're caught up in their own opposition."

In contrast to the moderates that recognize the need for reform, there exists a faction which advocates a return to the old
canons of apartheid. 78 Primarily Afrikaan-speaking, these whites
advocate separate development with no integration between
groups of different races, culture, language and religion.7 9 Underlying this inflexibility is their deep-seated belief in the racial
superiority of whites and a fear of the consequences of black
rule. 0 For hard-line Afrikaners, the Dutch Reformed Church is
70. CRAPANZANO, supra note 8, at 21. See also, Wash. Post, June 4, 1986, at Al, col. 2.
See also, N.Y. Times, March 9, 1986, (Magazine), at 19.
71. For a discussion of political parties and pressure groups in South Africa see Louw
& KENDALL, supra note 19, at 77-91. For a statistical analysis of Afrikaan versus English
speaking whites' attitudes toward seven fundamental apartheid laws see SOUTH AFRICA:
A PLURAL SOCIETY IN TRANSITION 314 (D. van Vuuren, N. Wiehahn, J. Lombard & N.
Rhoodie ed. 1985). (hereinafter A PLURAL SOCIETY].

72. Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at 206.
73. "We would like to speed up evolution a bit. We are trying to do that. But we
can't rush things too much. If you rush things, you'll have chaos." CRAPANZANO, supra
note 8, at 188.
74. Id. at 21.
75. Id. at 74.
76. See generally, Brock, supra note 52, at 32. N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1986, (Magazine),
at 14.
77. CRAPANZANO, supra note 8, at 303.
78. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1985, at A7, col. 4.
79. Louw & KENDALL, supra note 19, at 80. See also, discussion of the Afrikaner
Broederbond in, CRAPANZANO, supra note 8, at 33.
80. Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at 227.
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the spiritual center of their community,81 and they look to the
church to provide a biblical justification for apartheid. 2 These
Afrikaners are by no means weak, 8 and they view any alternative which excludes their control of power as suicide.8
C. Reform or Rhetoric?
Juxtaposed between the rival factions within the white community is the current government headed by State President
Botha. President Botha has openly committed himself to constitutional, social and economic reform which will involve blacks in
political decision-making.8 Even his critics admit that "he has
shown himself to be the first Afrikaner nationalist leader with
any aptitude for taking other viewpoints into account

. . .

and

had the courage to make demands on his own people." 8 Despite
his willingness for reform, President Botha has been checked by
fear of a hard-liner backlash. 7 Nevertheless, some significant reform has occurred under his administration.8
An analysis of reforms to the apartheid system must begin
CRAPANZANO, supra note 8,at 93.
82. Id. at 100. "The principle of separate development so as to be able to serve one's
own people is in complete agreement with the Bible teaching of unity in diversity,
whereas integration and assimilation weaken this diversity and reduce it to a uniformity
and monotony." Id. However, the Dutch Reformed Church has recently questioned its
own justification of apartheid. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1986, at A14, col. 1.
83. See Louw & KENDALL, supra note 19, at 19. See also, Wash. Times, June 2, 1986,
at Al, col. 3.
84. Brock, supra note 52, at 30.
85. Louw & KENDALL, supra note 19, at 84. See also, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1986, at A2,
col. 3. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1985, at A6, col. 3.
86. LELYVELD, supra note 8, at 258. "He set out to reform and has made a tragic mess
of it." N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1986, at As, col. 4.
87. See Wash. Post, June 26, 1986, at Al, col. 1. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1986, at Al, col.
6. N.Y. Times, March 7, 1986, at A4, col. 3. N.Y. Times, May 7, 1986, at A8, col. 3.
88. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1986, at A2, col. 1. See generally, Louw & KENDALL, supra
note 19, at 69-70.
A process of reform was set in motion in the 1970's, with the introduction of 99year leasehold, the relaxation of restrictions on black trading rights, relaxation
of influx control, the scrapping of job reservation, the legislation of black unions
and the decision to privatise all government houses in the black townships. More
recently, the Mixed Marriages Act and the Political Interference Act and the
Immorality Act (Section 16) were repealed, the policy of progressively opening
central business districts to all races was introduced, and segregation regarding
amenities such as cinemas was relaxed. Influx control is to go this year.
Id. at 70.
81.
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with the abolition of the pass laws. 9 The pass laws represented
a conglomeration of statutes which prohibited blacks from traveling into or working in the so-called whites-only cities.9 0 Pass
laws had been one of the cornerstones of apartheid for over 70
years,9 ' and the cruelty of these laws is not in dispute. 9 While
their repeal does not represent an end to apartheid, it is nonetheless a significant step.93 Under the new system implemented
by the government, "there is no difference in the law between
black and white people." 9 '
Other reforms initiated by the Botha government include:
the legalization of black trade unions,9" the unenforcement of
the Group Areas Act,96 the recognition of freehold property
rights for blacks in black areas,97 and the inculcation of
Coloureds and Indians into a tricameral legislature. 98 Enthusi89. Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at 59-61 (describing the pass laws); Wash.
Post, June 6, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
90. Wash. Post, June 6, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
91. N.Y. Times, April 24, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
92. "All South African blacks over age 16-and only blacks-have been required to
carry identity books showing where they may live and work. More than 200,000 were
arrested in 1984 for violating what the regime calls 'influx controls.'" N.Y. Times, April
22, 1986, at A30, col. 1. For a detailed discussion of the pass laws see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, SOUTH AFRICA: IMPRISIONMENT UNDER THE PASS LAWS (Jan. 1986).
93. N.Y. Times, April 24, 1986, at Al, col. 6. Bergen Record, May 1, 1986, at A23, col.
3.
94. The Black Sash, Johannesburg Advice Office 1 (1986) (unpublished manuscript).
The Black Sash is a women's anti-apartheid protest group in South Africa. See N.Y.
Times, April 24, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
95. For a detailed discussion of the growth of trade unions see A PLURAL SOCIETY,
supra note 71, at 120-171. See also, Louw & KENDALL, supra note 19, at 87-88. N.Y.
Times Feb. 3, 1986, at A2, col. 1.
96. Business Day, Sept. 3, 1986, at Al, col. 3. For a discussion of the Group Areas Act
see Louw & KENDALL, supra note 19, at 41. For example, it is reported that "In the
urban neighborhoods of Hillbrow, Berea and Mayfair, an estimated 20,000 nonwhites live
in open defiance of the Group Areas Act, which reserves such places for whites only. A
government minister conceded this month that officials have been 'turning a blind eye'
to violations of the law." Phila. Enquirer, Sept. 29, 1986, at Al, col. 4.
97. For a discussion of the Native Land Act see Louw & KENDALL, supra note 19, at
35. Black people can now buy a house with a 99-year leasehold or with freehold title, but
only in areas designated black urban townships. Black Sash, supra note 94, at 3.
98. An amendment to the South African Constitution was adopted in 1983 which
established a tricameral legislature with seperate representation in each house by the
Whites, Coloureds and Indians. Louw & KENDALL, supra note 19, at 77. For a discussion
of the South African Constitution see A PLURAL SOCIETY, supra note 71, at 1-27. It is
generally recognized that the spark which ignited the recent violence was the imposition
of the tricameral legislature, which inculcated 3.5 million Coloureds and Indians into the
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asm for these reforms must be tempered by the realization that
"young blacks are not interested in gradual change." 99 Member
of Parliament Roelf Meyer contends that as whites have moved
toward the middle ground of power sharing, blacks have moved
toward the unacceptable alternative of complete control of the
country. 100 Thus, as blacks increase the use of violence,
Afrikaners respond with increased internal repression.0' As attitudes polarize, the crucial question becomes whether change can
take place fast enough to prevent a confrontation that would almost certainly produce appalling bloodshed. 02
One faction which generally seeks to avert this confrontation is the South African Judiciary. "South Africa's judiciary has
a reputation, even amongst the current government's most bitter
enemies, for a reasonsable degree of courage and independence."1 8 For example, the Supreme Court of the Natal Province ruled in a case involving the indefinite detention of blacks
without trial, that certain portions of the emergency decree
granting this authority were invalid.' 0 Unfortunately, this decision was reversed by the country's highest court. 0 5 Nevertheless,
at times the courts have been able to ease tensions. 06
U.S. POLICY

Returning now to the means/end analysis and what the U.S.
can do to avert a confrontation, one mean that has received significant attention in contemporary political debate has been the
use of economic sanctions as a tool for bringing about a desired
system but noticeably absented 21 million Africans. BENSON, supra note 24, at 224-225.
99. Brock, supra note 52, at 31.
100. Interview with Roelf Meyer, Nationalist Party Member of Parliament, in Cape
Town, RSA (Sept. 8, 1986).
101. Wash. Post, July 16, 1986, at A23, col. 1. Wash. Times, June 23, 1986, at Al, col.
1.
102. Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at XX.
103. Louw & KENDALL, supra note 19, at 196. See also, BENSON, supra note 24, at
121.
104. N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1986, at A3, col. 4.
105. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1986, at A6, col. 2.
106. In a recent case, the judge threw out the key element of the state's case and
acquitted four black trade union officials of treason. Wash. Post, June 24, 1986, at Al,
col. 1. Courts have also been influential in easing press restrictions imposed under the
emergency decree. N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1986, at A3, col. 1. But cf. Dugard, Using the
Law to Pervert Justice, 11 HUMAN RIrHTS 22 (1983), A.B.A. Sec. Indiv. Rts. & Resp.
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foreign policy end. 10 7 For much of the last decade, U.S. policy
has centered around the notion of constructive engagement.'
Constructive engagement represents a policy of open dialogue
and interaction which sympathetically encourages change. 0 9 As
a result of a perception of South African intransigence to U.S.
demands and internal pressure for more stringent actions, the
Reagan Administration has begun to tighten the screws on
South Africa. On September 9, 1985, President Reagan signed
Executive Order 12532, which outlined limited economic sanctions to be imposed on South Africa."'
While not entirely retreating from the concept of constructive engagement, President Reagan has initiated a new approach
he terms "active constructive engagement.""' The "active" ingredient of this new policy was the implementation of limited
economic sanctions. Mr. Reagan banned the sale of computers to
South African security agencies; barred most loans to the Pretoria Government; proposed a ban on the importation of the Kruggerrand, the South African gold coin, subject to consultations
with trading partners; and prohibited most exports of nuclear
technology. 1 2 These measures were aimed "against the machinery of apartheid, without indiscriminately punishing the people
who are the victims of that system, measures that will disassociate the United States from apartheid, but associate us positively
3
with peaceful change.""1
107. Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at 420.
108. For a discussion of the history of United States policy towards South Africa see
Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at 341-62.
109. N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 4.
110. Exec. Order No. 12532, 50 Fed. Reg. 175 (1985). The introductory comment to
Executive Order 12532 states:
By the authority vested in me as President . . . considering that the policy and
practice of apartheid are repugnant to the moral and political values of democratic and free societies and run counter to United States policies to promote
democratic governments throughout the world and respect for human rights, and
the policy of the United States to influence peaceful change in South Africa...
I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, find that the
policies and actions of the Government of South Africa constitute an unusual
and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy and economy of the United States
and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.
111. N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 4.
112. N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
113. Id. President Reagan reimposed the limited sanctions outlined in his Executive
Order for a second year and asserted that additional measures were under consideration.
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Not all factions agreed that the President's limited economic sanctions were strong enough to bring about the desired
changes. Randall Robinson, co-chairman of the Free South Africa Movement, accused the President of reconciling his sympathy for the white minority government in South Africa with
growing domestic opposition to his program of constructive engagement.'" Members of Congress accused the President of circumventing support for House Resolution 1460, the AntiApartheid Act of 1985.15 This bill, unlike the Executive Order,
required stiffer sanctions in one year if no progress had been
made."'
In response to growing domestic pressure," 7 Congress reintroduced sanctions legislation in 1986, and in defiance of an Executive veto,"' enacted House Resolution 4868, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986." 9 The Anti-Apartheid Act calls
for the banning of new U.S. loans to South African businesses
and the South African government, forbids new U.S. investments in South Africa (this provision does not apply to reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa), halts the importation of
South African iron, steel, coal, uranium, textiles and agricultural
products, severs the U.S. landing rights for South African Airways, and authorizes $40 million in aid to disadvantaged South
N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1986, at A5, col. 1.
114. N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1985, at A13, col. 1. Mr. Robinson stated that "the South
African Government will be pleased no doubt that President Reagan remains a de facto
ally of that vicious regime." Id. At the same time, conservative critic, Burton Yale Pines,
vice-president of the Heritage Foundation, asserted that "[i]t makes the whole problem
in South Africa worse unless what you want in South Africa is revolution. You will see
white hard-liners dig in their heels and say, 'Look what we got from Botha playing ball
with the United States on constructive engagement - nothing.'" Id.
115. 131 Cong. Rec. H7291 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1985) (statement of Rep. Gray).
116. 131 Cong. Rec. S11053, supra note 1.
117. "Apartheid has become a domestic issue during an election year in which control
of the Senate is at risk." Baker, The Sanctions Vote: A G.O.P. Milestone, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 26, 1986, at A17, col. 1.
118. President Reagan vetoed H.R. 4868 stating that the United States cannot "turn
its back and walk away" from South Africa. Mr. Reagan contended that "Itihe sweeping
and punitive sanctions adopted by the Congress are targeted directly at the labor-intensive industries upon which the victimized peoples of South Africa depend for their very
survival." Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 1986, at Al, col. 5.
119. The House of Representatives overrode the veto by a vote of 313 to 83. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 30, 1986, at Al, col. 1. The Senate override vote was 78 to 21. Wash. Post,
Oct. 3, 1986, at Al, col. 4.
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Africans regardless of race.120 The law states as U.S. policy that
additional sanctions will be imposed if substantial progress toward dismantling apartheid is not made within a year.' 2 ' The
Act further provides that these sanctions would be lifted if certain conditions were met, including freeing Nelson Mandela, releasing political prisoners, allowing the formation of political
parties, and lifting the state of emergency. 2 2
Advocates of sanctions applauded Congress' action, maintaining that "sometimes we need to feel good about who we are
and what we stand for.' 23 President Reagan, on the other hand,
asked:
Are we truly helping the black people of South Africa
- the lifelong victims of apartheid - when we throw
them out of work and leave them and their families jobless and hungry in those segregated townships? Or are we
simply assuming a moral posture at the expense of the
1 24
people in whose name we presume to act?
Another conservative critic contended that:
Passing sanctions against South Africa is a perfect example of the Pontius Pilate school of foreign policy at work
- we are washing our hands of the situation. Our actions
are a perverted statement of morality. We should take
our moral guidance from Christ who came into the world
and deliberately associated with sinners so that he could
have a positive influence on the development of their
spiritual lives.'
120. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086
(1986). See also Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 1986, at A16, col. 4.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Rep. William H. Gray III (D.,Pa.), quoted in N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1986, at Al,
col. 1.
124. Address by President Reagan, on his veto of H.R. 4868, Sept. 27, 1986, excerpted in N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1986, at A4, col. 1.
125. Conversation with William W. Pascoe, policy analyst of the Heritage Foundation
(Oct. 3, 1986). See also, Gladwell, Fact, Fancy and the Mystique of Africa, 2 INSIGHT 8
(1986). "On a political level, there is a deepening awareness in the West about the geopolitical realities facing Africa, but the commitment is not deep, as seen in the superficial
approaches many in the West have adopted: disinvest in South Africa: throw food at the
starving masses. Once the specific problem is dealt with, Western interest declines rapidly." Id. at 7 (introduction).
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Consequently, an analysis of the effectiveness of economic sanctions and the prudency of their use in the conduct of foreign
policy is particularly useful in light of the enactment of the
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.
EXERTING INFLUENCE THROUGH ECONOMIC MEANS

A.

Private Sector

Before beginning a sanctions analysis it is necessary to provide an examination of actions which have been taken or are
proposed in the private sector. The primary action taken to date
is the adoption by many U.S. companies of the Sullivan Principles.1 26 The Sullivan Principles were proposed by the Reverend
Leon Sullivan, a black West Virginian Baptist, while serving as a
member of the Board of Directors of General Motors Corporation in 1977.127 These principles represent an employment code
for American businesses active in South Africa, and they have
become widely accepted today. 2 8 The major tenets of the code
call for non-segregation in the workplace, equal employment
practices, training programs for blacks, placement of blacks in
supervisory positions, support for the freedom of mobility of
black workers and support for the ending of all apartheid
laws.12 9 While these principles are voluntary and are not of
themselves a solution, they do represent a part of a process to
bring about fundamental change. 30
One other private sector response to the problem of
apartheid which warrants mentioning is the notion of divest126. Sullivan, Agents For Change: The Mobilization Of Multinational Companies in
South Africa, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 427 (1983). Reverend Sullivan defines the principles as a "strategy of mobilizing the influence of U.S. multinational companies to contribute to peaceful change in South Africa." Id.
127. Id. at 428.
128. Id. at 429. Sullivan reports that presently, as a result of continuing efforts and
pressures of many sorts, some 146 U.S. companies are signatories to the Principles.
These signatories employ approximately 80% of those working for U.S. companies in
South Africa. Id. Reverend Sullivan advocates education and training because, "I learned
that integration without preparation is frustration." N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1985, at A12,
col. 2.
129. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1985, at A12, col. 5.
130. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1985, at A12, col. 2. Reverend Sullivan believes that next
year represents a fork in the road for South Africa and that if substantial reforms are not
undertaken by May 31, 1987, he will call for the total withdrawal of U.S. corporations
from South Africa. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1986, at D22, col. 1.
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ment.'3 ' Many cities, states, universities and corporations are
coming under increasing pressure to divest of all assets in companies doing business in South Africa or withdraw all corporate

operations from there. 32 For example, California recently en-

acted legislation which will require that state pension and university funds sell more than $11 billion worth of securities in
companies doing business in South Africa.13 3 Similar divestment
action has been taken by 19 states, 68 cities and 119 universities.13 4 At least 30 cities have gone so far as to enact legislation

that curtails the awarding of contracts to corporations operating
in South Africa.' 3 ' Among corporations, 39 firms pulled out of
South Africa in 1985 and 22 have done so already in 1986.'

e

Foremost among these firms is IBM, Coca-Cola and General
37

Motors.
Proponents of divestment maintain that it will foster the economic isolation that will force Pretoria to change, "' while
131. For a comprehensive definition of divestment See, Chettle, The Law and Policy
of Divestment of South African Stock, 15 LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 445-446 (1983).
132. See generally, The South Africa Investment Debate: Divestiture of Stockholder
Pressure?, 4 Bus. & Soc'v REV. 16 (1984). See also, Brom, Holding Court on South Africa, 5 CAL. LAW 22 (1985).
133. N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1986, at Al, col. 3.
134. Id. New Jersey enacted divestiture legislation over a year ago involving $2 billion in pension funds. New Jersey anticipates losing over $100 million in lost interest and
transaction costs from this legislation. N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1986, at A6, col. 5.
135. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1986, at Al, col. 5. For example, a Chicago ordinance gives
an 8 percent bidding preference to companies not operating in South Africa. Id.
136. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1986, at DI, col. 4.
137. Id. IBM plans to continue selling its products and services in South Africa, but
the business will be carried on through a new company being formed by its current employees in South Africa. The President of IBM has stated: "We are not in business to
conduct moral activity, we are not in business to conduct socially responsible action. We
are in business to conduct business." N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1986, at Al, col. 4. Coca-Cola
meanwhile stated that their move was in reaction to apartheid and that they hoped to
structure a deal whereby black South Africans would be able to purchase their facility.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1986, at Dl, col. 3. General Motors cited financial losses and
apartheid as their rationale for withdrawing and asserted that it would continue to sell
automotive components to its former subsidiary. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1986, at Al, col. 3.
But cf. Mobil Oil, the largest U.S. investor in South Africa, refuses to disinvest stating
that "Mobil will not walk away from the problems." Wash. Times, July 25, 1986, at Al,
col. 5.
138. See generally, Davis, Cason, Hovey, Economic Disengagement And South Africa: The Effectiveness And Feasibility of Implementing Sanctions And Divestment, 15
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 529 (1983). The authors conclude that the extensive involvement
in the South African economy by U.S. corporations has no reforming effect on apartheid
and, indeed, only serves to support the status quo. Id. at 553. Consequently, they con-
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others, like noted South African author Alan Paton, believe that
"those who will pay most grievously for disinvestment will be
the black workers of South Africa."' 18 9 Regardless of the effects
on South Africa, divestment raises numerous legal questions for
United States courts and lawmakers. These issues include: potential breach of fiduciary duty by pension trustees, " " and constitutional challenges under the commerce clause, the federal
foreign affairs powers, and the preemption doctrine."" Nonetheless, for the purposes of this study, the effects of disinvestment
can be viewed in conjunction with a sanctions analysis.
tend that "economic disengagement will weaken the South African economic system
which supports the entire enforcement apparatus of apartheid and maintains the minority's total control of political power." Id. at 554-555.
139. Paton, An Act of Immorality, DISINVESTMENT, June, 1985, at 2. Those opposed
to disinvestment maintain that ". . .business has been in the forefront of promoting reforms in apartheid." Wash. Post, Oct. 4, 1986, at A9, col. 1. Also, U.S. firms that are
committed to fighting apartheid often stop contributing to social programs when they
withdraw from South Africa. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1986, at F4, col. 2. For example, one
of IBM's numerous social programs called for a $15 million grant to black education over
the next five years. "In South Africa, we dedicate a far greater proportion of gross earnings to corporate responsibility programs than in any other foreign country in which we
do business." IBM Operations in South Africa. (April, 1986) (unpublished manuscript).
140. See generally, Langbein, Social Investing of Pension Funds and University Endowments: Unprincipled, Futile, and Illegal. NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 1-28 (1985). Professor Langbein maintains that "[a] trustee who sacrifices the
beneficiary's financial well-being for any social cause violates both his -duty of loyalty to
the beneficiary and his duty of prudence in investment." Id. at 16. See also, N.Y. Times,
May 16, 1986, at A35, col. 2. Economist Milton Friedman contends that "[u]niversity
endowments were given for a specific purpose: to promote the educational activities of
the university. The people administering these endowments are operating in a fiduciary
capacity." Administrators of these endowments thus must "seek the highest return, consistent with safety, that they can." Id. See also, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1985, at A31, col. 2.
The President of the University of Miami argues that divestiture could have a proportionally greater economic impact on the universities than on South Africa. Id. See also,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1986, at A34, col. 6 (letter to Editor). "One could reasonably conclude that those who will be effectively punished are those who stand to benefit one day
from the Archdiocese pension plan." Id.
141.

See generally Blaustein, Disinvestment -

TIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST

The Constitutional Question, NA-

75-94 (1985). Professor Blaustein con-

cludes that "[d]isinvestment laws are of such doubtful constitutionality that legal counsel should presently advise against their passage and, where enacted, caution against
their enforcement." Id. at 76. See also, 72 VA. L. REV. 813-850 (1986). But cf., on the
constitutionality of the preemption doctrine claim, 132 Cong. Rec. S12533 (daily ed.
Sept. 15, 1986) (statement of Prof. Lawrence Tribe).
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Public Sector: Economic Sanctions

The goal of economic sanctions is to force the target state,
by the imposition of economic pain, to act in a manner that conforms more closely to the initiator's preferences and interests. 4 2
This goal can be attained by forcing reform, or failing that, by
inciting revolution as a result of the economic dislocation produced by the sanctions., 3 Either way, a non-conforming target
government is replaced. This foreign policy instrument is often
advocated because it occupies a middle ground between diplomatic bargaining and military force.'' At a minimum, the effective application of sanctions has two requirements. First, the initiator must maintain an uneven level of economic vulnerability
over the target,14 5 and second, there must be a high degree of
compliance by other actors in the international arena."" Because
of the difficulties in fulfilling these requirements the primary
goal of making the target state reform is often supplemented by
a more realistic domestic goal. Changing the behavior of other
nations may be less important to the initiator's government than
addressing the desires of domestic political groups." 7
The realization that sanctions are often invoked to promote
domestic concerns must also be tempered by the realization that
sanctions can have effects which are contrary to their purpose.
Often, the spectacle of a superpower wielding its economic might
against a weaker nation will rouse the patriotic indignation of its
population and generate a "rally-round-the-flag" effect to the
target government's benefit. 141 Other contrary effects include:
the vulnerability of the initiator to retaliatory countermeasures
taken by the target;" 9 the increased influence of conservatives,
142.

Nincic & Wallensteen, Economic Coercion and Foreign Policy, in DILEMMAS OF

ECONOMIC COERCION: SANCTIONS IN WORLD POLITICS
ECONOMIC COERCION].

143.
144.
145.
146.

4 (1983). [hereinafter

DILEMMAS OF

Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Wallensteen, Economic Sanctions: Ten Modern Cases and Three Important
Lessons, in DILEMMAS OF ECONOMIC COERCION, supra note 142, at 120-25.
147. DILEMMAS OF ECONOMIC COERCION, supra note 142, at 7-8.
148. Id. at 6.
149. Gordon, The Politicsof InternationalSanctions: A Case Study of South Africa,
in DILEMMAS OF ECONOMIC COERCION, supra note 142, at 202.
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or promoters of the status-quo in the target state;' 5 0 and also an
opportunity for rival powers to exploit the souring of relations
between the target and the initiator. 5 '
Taking these factors into consideration, it is generally recognized that economic coercion is often ineffective as a means of
inducing compliance.'"2 The history of sanctions is one of noble
purpose and flawed results.'5 3 Consequently, a decision maker
should recognize that current economic sanctions may jeopardize
the initiator's subsequent ability to pursue foreign policy goals
via economic pressure. The more total is the present punishment, the more one's future capacity to apply such measures
may be undermined. 15 ' Therefore, economic sanctions may serve
the purpose of expressing moral disapproval best when they are
of a symbolic nature and value-deprivation is kept low.'5 5
In the context of South Africa, economic sanctions seem
particularly inappropriate. First, there has not been united action by the countries that comprise the sender nations. While
150. Id. at 198.
151. Wallensteen, supra note 146, at 123.
152. Green, Strategies for Evading Economic Sanctions, in DILEMMAS OF ECONOMIC
COERCION, supra note 142, at 81. See generally, Wallensteen, supra note 146, at 91. Wallensteen outlines ten modern cases where economic sanctions have been applied and contrasts their effectiveness. On the whole, Wallensteen concludes that 8 of the 10 were
unsuccessful. Id. at 96. The ten cases studied include: United Kingdom sanctions against
the Soviet Union in 1933 for the release of British citizens; League of Nations Sanctions
against Italy in 1935-36 for an end to the war on Ethiopia; Arab League sanctions against
Israel in 1945 to stop Jewish settlements and prevent the consolidation of Israel; Soviet
sanctions against Yugoslavia in 1948-55 to install a pro-Soviet regime; African states
sanctions against South Africa in 1960 to abolish apartheid; United States sanctions
against Cuba in 1960 to undermine the Castro regime; United States sanctions against
the Dominican Republic in 1960-62 to create a democratic regime; Soviet sanctions
against Albania in 1961 to prevent a pro-China policy; Organization of African Unity
sanctions against Portugal in 1963-75 to achieve decolonization; and, United Kingdom
sanctions against Rhodesia in 1965-80 to return to legal rule. Id. at 91. The two successes
were the Soviet sanctions against Yugoslavia and United States sanctions against the
Dominican Republic. Id. at 95.
See also, Wasserman, Apartheid and Economic Sanctions, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L.
366 (1981). The author contends that "economic sanctions are not going to force Pretoria
to its knees. While punitive economic measures may well hurt small countries, especially
developing countries with unstable economic foundations ... they are unlikely to effect
highly industrialized countries with a diversified economy." Id. at 367-68.
153. 131 Cong. Rec. S10715 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985) (statement of Sen. Eagleton).
154. DILEMMAS OF ECONOMIC COERCION, supra note 142, at 10.
155. Galtung, On the Effects of InternationalEconomic Sanctions: With Examples
from the Case of Rhodesia, in DILEMMAS OF ECONOMIC COERCION, supra note 142, at 49.
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the European community and Japan have imposed some limited
sanctions, each has separate interests and has targeted separate
facets of the South African economy for isolation.' 56 Second, the
sender nations seem unwilling to accept the concommitant economic repercussions on their own economies that would result
from the imposition of stringent sanctions.' 57 Third, the threat
of sanctions has been looming ominously over South Africa for
many years and the government has had ample opportunity to
establish alternative trade routes to facilitate "sanctions busting."' 58 Fourth, those South Africans currently living on the
margin of human existence will be particularly hard hit as need
rapidly increases against a stagnant supply.' 59 Fifth, black unemployment will increase' 0 and working conditions will deterio156. The European Community recently imposed new limited sanctions against
South Africa including the bannirg of imports of iron, steel and of gold coins and a
prohibition on new investment there. Noticeably absent from the sanctions package was
coal, of which the Common Market countries bought about $1.2 billion last year, and the
minerals that are vital to the steel industry. For example, South Africa supplies West
Germany with roughly 70 percent of its ferrochrome, 40 percent of its manganese and 25
percent of its vanadium. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1986, at Al, col. 4. Japan meanwhile,
South Africa's second largest trading partner behind the U.S., has banned the importation of South African iron and steel. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1986, at A4, col. 1. Nevertheless, Japan continues to import minerals and rare metals necessary for its microchip industry and has exported over $1.8 billion in cars, machinery, and electronics. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 5, 1986, at A4, col. 3.
157. •British Prime Minsiter Margaret Thatcher noted that as many as 120,000 jobs in
Britain depend on their economic relationship with South Africa. Wash. Post, June 14,
1986, at A20, col. 1. South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha has threatened to cutoff South African imports of U.S. agricultural products in response to the imposition of
sanctions. N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1986, at Al, col. 5.
158. Wash. Post, July 9, 1986, at A15, col. 2.
159. In response to questions concerning the impact of sanctions on emergency feeding programs for starving South African children, Ida Pearlman of Operation Hunger
stated:
By that action, [further U.S. economic sanctions] we will probably immediately
double our normal death rate of 50,000 children under the age of 5, a year, and
that they [those who would impose sanctions] could be placing at least another
400,000 under the age of 15 at risk . . . They [those who would impose sanctions] have an absolute moral obligation to make sure that they know what the
price will be and to decide whether they are prepared to live with that price.
White House Talking Points, The President's Stand Against Apartheid 3 (unpublished
document) (For more information call White House Office of Public Affairs: (202) 4567170) (also reported on NBC July 20, 1986).
160. See e.g. The imposition of limited sanctions has had a serious impact on South
Africa's coal exports and jeopardizes the jobs of as many as 40,000 miners. Wash. Post,
July 25, 1986, at A27, col. 1. "It is quite clear that sanctions are going to increase black
unemployment. It is therefore quite clear that sanctions are going to increase black un-
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rate as Western corporations withdraw and sell assets to buyers
with no concern for human rights.' 61 And finally, economic sanctions seem inappropriate because the majority of the people of
the receiving state - those whom the initiator is trying to help
62
do not favor the use of economic sanctions.'
A survey of vital U.S. interests in South Africa also serves to
moderate against any rational basis for imposing sanctions.
South Africa is essential to the strategic survival of the United
States and Western Europe.'63 In the Free World, only South
Africa produces chromium, platinum and vanadium, which are
strategic minerals essential in defense and modern industry.'"
rest. This is exactly what the purveyors of violence want them to do. Hunger is their
ally." Buthelezi, Remarks at the Natal Agricultural Union, 96th Annual Congress (Sept.
10, 1986) (unpublished transcript of speech).
161. The new owners often try to make the business more profitable by cutting wages
and dropping social spending programs. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1986, at D1, col. 4.
162. For a detailed analysis see Black opinion on Disinvestment, Weighing the Survey Evidence, Lawrence Schlemmer, August, 1986.
Where the questions are posed in simple terms as a choice between continued
investment or disinvestment, with no embellishments or suggestive references to
political effects, groups who support sanctions or the effect on job-creation, seventy-five percent or more of rank-and-file black respondents oppose disinvestment (Schlemmer: June 1984; November 1984; HSRC July 1984; May 1985).
Where the respondents are better-educated (HSRC February 1985) or are selected in a snap survey which tends to bias sampling away from industrial workers towards easily interviewed unemployed youth or service workers (Star, February 1985) the opposition to disinvestment drops but a majority nevertheless
opposes disinvestment. In all these instances of neutral forced choice the respondents split in favour of continued investment, putting economic welfare above
vaguely understood political considerations.
Id. at 7.
It is certainly true that a majority of black spokespeople, members of the middle
class intelligentsia, students and clergymen support sanctions. This is not surprising since their interests are political rather than economic. They would undoubtedly benefit from an economic collapse if it meant a consequent collapse of
the South African government - an unlikely outcome.
Id. at 10. See also, ORKIN, THE STRUGGLE AND THE FUTURE, WHAT BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS
REALLY THINK (1986). A survey of the Sunday Times of London found that "[tlhirtynine percent had never heard of sanctions or had no opinion, while 32 percent opposed
them and 29 percent favored them." Wash. Post, Aug. 3, 1986, at A21, col. 1.
163. See generally, Robert Hanks, Southern Africa and Western Security, FOREIGN
POLICY REPORT 52 (1983). See also, Rhoda Plotfein, The United States and South Africa: The Strategic Connection, CURRENT HISTORY 201 (1986). See also, South Africa in
World Strategy. The Strategic Importance of South Africa in the East-West Struggle.
Special Brief No. 38 (1966). See also, Wash. Times, July 29, 1985, at Al, col. 2.
164. Wash. Times, July 31, 1985, at Al, col. 2. Together, South Africa and the Soviet
Union hold some 95 percent of the world's vanadium reserves, 94 percent of its manga-
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South Africa also has control of the shipping lanes around the
Cape which provide the West with much of its oil. 65 In this regard, South Africa represents the jugular vein of the West."
These geological and geographical realities make it crucial for
the West to prevent Soviet hegemony over the region." 7 All
semblances of human rights considerations and reform would
succumb to a primary U.S. strategic concern in an East/West
balance of power struggle over South Africa.'6 8
These vital U.S. interests can be fostered through the advancement of secondary interests which inculcate Western values into South African society and promote reform. These secondary interests include: the recognition of a need for human
rights developments,"6 9 the maintenance of satisfactory diplonese, 90 percent of its platinum group metals, 84 percent of its chrome, and an important
proportion of other strategic minerals." Plotkin, supra note 163, at 202. "Without strategic. minerals like chromium, manganese and the platinum group metals, we really

couldn't make a jet engine." Id. at 201.
165. Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at XXIII. "The United States and many
countries in Western Europe remain heavily - some critically - dependent on the Cape
Route flow of petroleum." Hanks, supra note 163, at 10.
166. Wash. Times, July 29, 1985, at Al, col. 2.
167. Id. The author asserts that "in sum, the blunt fact remains that South Africa
represents the jugular vein of the West, and that even if South Africa had no controversial and unpopular racial and ethnic regulations, that country would be a target of Soviet
imperialism . .

.

.Therefore, they use what is called in Soviet jargon active measures

that entail propaganda, subversion, agents of influence, disinformation and other techniques implemented primarily by the KGB in cooperation with all Soviet agencies and
assets to bring about the gradual collapse of our will to resist." Id.
Hanks contends that the Soviets are seeking to establish hegemony by isolating
South Africa with a cordon of Marxist states, running from coast to coast across the
lower portion of the continent. When completed, this cordon would consist of Angola,
South West Africa (Namibia), Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Hanks,
supra note 163, at 49.
168. "The earlier African view that the U.S. regarded African countries basically as
pawns in the cold war, and that it tilted naturally toward white-ruled South Africa out of
an underlying racial bias, still lies fairly close to the surface." Ottaway, Africa: U.S. Policy Eclipse, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 646 (1980). "One of the most important areas in the eastwest conflict is South Africa and that is why the propaganda of the Communist countries
has skillfully exploited western guilt, ignorance and a geniune desire to do good, and so
succeeded in achieving a degree of isolation of South Africa and certainly a preoccupation with the 'colour problem.'" South Africa in World Strategy, supra note 163, at 1.
169. See generally, supra note 2. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 32. "South Africa,
with its vast network of statutory laws, is a land where the black man, against whom the
majority of the laws are directed, at some time during his lifetime almost invariably finds
himself in prison. This has become generally accepted even by the courts . .

.

. Black

prisoners are treated as though they were members of a lower species." Id. at 222.
See, e.g., The United States government recently donated $96,000 for legal aid to
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matic and commercial relations, 170 and the resolution of regional
conflicts which threaten stability.17 1 A fundamental element of
all these interests, both primary and secondary, is U.S. involvement. Any foreign policy approach which serves to isolate South
Africa, like sanctions, may provide moral exoneration for its promoters, but does notprotect U.S. interests.
A final consideration in the sanctions equation involves the
South African response. Louis Nel, Deputy Foreign Minister of
South Africa, asserted that sanctions, however mild, impede
peaceful reform because the resulting economic deprivation
brings an increase in tension and frustration and a consequent
radicalization of communities. 172 Recent events lend credence to
the claim that external influences that strike at the economic
base of society only serve to polarize conflicting factions and
destabilize the situation. Since the imposition of sanctions the
government has stepped-up internal repression. Foreign television has been banned from reporting incidents of internal strife
and street violence,1 73 plans have been made to expel the nearly
blacks in human rights cases. Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 1986, at A19, col. 1. For a breakdown
of United States aid to South Africa, see Wash. Post, Aug. 5, 1986, at A17, col. 1.
170. One major international commercial concern is South Africa's repayment of its
foreign debt. South Africa's debt troubles have been more political than economic. Pretoria froze its debt repayments after major creditors . . .refused last August to renew
short-term loans that were maturing. Of the $14 billion debt, British banks hold about
$5.5 billion, American banks $4.5 billion and West German, Swiss and French banks $4
billion. All of these institutions became worried about the risks of lending to South Africa following months of clashes between blacks and security forces in the country's segregated townships. The American banks, in particular, were the targets of an outspoken
anti-apartheid movement. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1986, at D1, col. 3.
171. In January, South Africa imposed a blockade on the country of Lesotho, a small
independent nation surrounded by South Africa. The Prime Minister of Lesotho, Leabua
Jonathan, accused Pretoria of trying to overthrow him by having the army turn against
him. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1986, at A3, col. 1. After 20 days of economic blockade the
government of Lesotho was overthrown in a bloodless coup. South Africa's black ruled
neighbors saw this as a bad omen because for the first time, with its blockade, Pretoria
seemed to have used economic muscle to contribute to the downfall of a black leader
whose policies it disliked. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1986, at A3, col. 1. For a discussion of the
current war in Angola see, Jonas Savimbi, The War Against Soviet Colonialism, POLICY
REVIEW 18-24 (Winter 1985). South Africa has proposed a linkage theory whereby they
would withdraw their troops from South West Africa (Namibia) if Cuba would withdraw
their troops from Angola. This condition has not been accepted. N.Y. Times, March, 5,
1986, at A7, col. 1.
172. N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1985, at A12, col. 1.
173. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1985, at Al, col. 6. The Government contended that the
foreign press was inciting violence for its own aims and presenting an unfair picture of
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1.5 million foreign black workers,'

stringent restrictions have

been placed on a number of former detainees, 175 economic pressure has been increased against vulnerable neighboring countries,176 further restrictions have been placed on the United
Democratic Front, the country's largest anti-apartheid movement, 7 7 and the government has reinstituted its policy of forced
8
removal of blacks from reclassified areas.17
Further isolation can be seen both internally and externally.
Internally, the far-right, which advocates a return to the traditional canons of apartheid, scored significant successes in five recent by-elections against the more moderate Nationalist Party of
State President Botha.' 79 Externally, Botha has threatened to
withhold exports of chromium, a strategically important mineral, to the U.S. and Western Europe. Botha warned that by digging a hole for South Africa, the West could be digging a hole
events, thus stirring protests and economic sanctions from abroad. Id. See also, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 12, 1985, at A15, col. 1.
174. Pretoria has repeatedly warned that this nation is the major stabilizing force in
southern Africa and that the imposition of punitive economic measures would hurt
neighboring countries that are closely linked to its well developed economy. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 12, 1985, at A15, col. 1.
South Africa has singled out Mozambican workers for expulsion in retaliation for
purported assistance to the ANC in violation of the Nkomati Accord. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9,
1986, at A14, col. 1. The 55,000 expelled Mozambican workers represent about $75 million in estimated earnings or one-third of Mozambiques dollar earnings. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 22, 1986, at Al, col. 3.
175. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1985, at A3, col. 1.
176. South Africa has begun to take retaliatory action against black-ruled neighboring states that favor sanctions. Wash. Post, Aug. 7, 1986, at A28, col. 1. Currently,
frontline states depend on South Africa's transportation network for 68 percent of their
import-export trade. Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1986, at A27, col. 1. "Zimbabwe is 90 percent
economically dependent on South Africa and its collapse would be swift, dramatic and
highly visible - giving the rest of the world pause to ponder." Wash. Times, June 23,
1986, at Al, col. 4. Furthermore, South African Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha, has
warned that "neighboring black countries would be the first to suffer if the West imposed sanctions against South Africa." N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
177. The government banned foreign financing for the United Democratic Front. The
UDF was formed in 1983 to challenge the new constitution. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1986, at
All, col. 1.
178. For the first time in over two years the government has ordered the removal of
10,000 Blacks from an area to further segregate them from white residential areas. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 18, 1986, at A3, col. 1. See also, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1986, at A15, col. 4.
179. The results were expected to indicate how much white resistence existed to the
Government's proposed limited changes in South Africa's policies of apartheid. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 31, 1985, at A6, col. 4.
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for itself. 180 This confrontational response to external pressure is
a by-product of a "laager mentality."' 8 ' Afrikaners pride themselves on being strong and "will not allow themselves to be humiliated in order to prevent sanctions."'8 2 Consequently, the resulting isolation and repudiation only serves to exacerbate
tensions, polarize positions, and lead down the path of
revolution.
CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA

An analysis of U.S. foreign policy in relation to South Africa
that asserts that stringent economic sanctions are not the solution is incomplete. A constructive study must include a hypothesis as to what will work. How best can the U.S. foster reform in
South Africa that will recognize the blacks' rights in the democratic process, yet not subject the minority to domination by the
majority? Unfortunately, most Afrikaners cannot envisage an acceptable alternative to apartheid that could ensure their survival
as a nation. 83 Perhaps the only acceptable avenue will be one
which recognizes a slow, but steady, change that transforms the
black work force into a skilled labor market. 84 Consequently, economic growth will become the chief subverter of apartheid, requiring, as it does, the enlistment and elevation of blacks in the
labor and managerial forces. 8 5 Changes in the economic sector
will dictate corresponding changes in social rights, such as improved housing and increased education, that will effectively and
peacefully serve to dismantle apartheid.
The country's economy is the most effective engine of social transformation, compelling whites to grant blacks
precisely the training and education, the livelihood and
personal rewards, the choices of where to live and work,
the associations and organizations, the sense of their own
180.

N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1985, at Al, col. 3.

181.
182.

N.Y. Times, June 15, 1986, section 4, at 1., col. 1.
Id.

183. de St. Jorre, South Africa: Is Change Coming?, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 106, 115 (1981).
184. Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at 96-100.
185. Hutchinson, Reagan and South Africa: The Case for Urgent Understanding,
National Review Nov. 1, 1985, at 32. See also, N.Y. Times, March 6, 1986, at A26, col. 1.
Some contend that capitalism is apartheid's most lethal opponent. West, Dancing to the
Antiapartheid Beat, INSIGHT, Aug. 18, 1986, at 72.
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power and community, that apartheid would deny
them.18
Furthermore:
Economies have a more powerful effect on the course of
events than any other factor. Almost everything else
politics, law, education, unemployment, poverty, unrest and so on - tends to be a consequence of economic
processes. The real issues behind virtually every piece of
legislation are economic: the motives are economic, the
means are economic and the consequences are
economic."'
Armed with the economic might, blacks can promulgate
peaceful reform in South Africa.'88 For reform to be meaningful
the black majority must control its destiny.'89 The U.S. should
not try to superimpose American morality on South Africa.190
For example, while Americans cling dearly to the notion of majority rule,
or one-man-one-vote, in Africa that is not the
9 l
norm.'
Fundamental differences must be recognized in any examination and application of international politics in
contemporary Africa. To ignore them would lead to mis186. 131 Cong. Rec. S11043 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1985) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
187. Louw & KENDALL, supra note 19, at 48.
188. With the growth of trade unions blacks have begun to exert more influence over
living and working conditions. Unions have used strikes to protest intolerable working
conditions. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1986, at A3, col. 1. Furthermore, in recent months unions
have moved away from apolitical positions and are now addressing political concerns.
Wash. Post, June 27, 1986, at A28, col. 4.
189. Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at XXI.
190. "[Americans] are agreed on certain fundamental propositions: that human
rights, if not exactly an American invention, are best defined as we understand and practice them in the United States; that the United States is the symbol of freedom in an
illiberal world; and that the United States has acted in a reasonably consistent manner
over the years to protect and extend the practice of human rights in the community of

nations."

GREENBERG,

supra note 3, at 40.

191. South Africa is not alone in denying blacks the opportunity to choose their government at the ballot box. Over 85% of black Africa is disenfranchised. Wolfson, Heart
Of Darkness, 34 POLICY REVIEW 42 (1985). Oppressive black governments claiming to be
victims of South African "destabilization" should not automatically earn external acceptance as the legitimate bearers of the standard of majority rule. Weisfelder, Human
Rights under Majority Rule in Southern Africa: The Mote in Thy Brother's Eye, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 91

(1984).
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understanding and misconceptions. Although the European colonial interlude in Africa introduced Western
concepts and ideas in its bid to westernize Africa, it did
not succeed in obliterating the basic cultures of the African peoples. The danger is not so much in Africa accepting Western cultures and ideas; the danger is in the
threat to the destruction of the African culture.192
With this limitation in mind, what reforms can placate all aspects of the South African equation? First, the majority must in
some way be brought into the political process. 193 While outright
majority rule seems unlikely, other alternatives are available.
State President Botha stated in his recent speech to the opening
session of Parliament that he would negotiate the establishment
of a "national statutory council" consisting of government officials and black leaders to advise the government on matters of
common concern. 9 ' By itself, this is a minor concession in that
the council would have no real power of its own. But, the introduction of blacks into the political process could pave the way
for more meaningful structural reforms.
It is difficult to envisage a formula for structural reform
that will appease all facets of South African society. In recognition of their multi-ethnic character, one commentator suggests:
"Power must be devolved from central to local government. Social, racial, ethnic and economic decisions must be returned to
the people they concern, and central government must be limited to aspects of administration which are not conflict-provoking." I" This decentralization of power would then lead to the
adoption of a canton system of government based on the Swiss
model.'9 6 This system would ensure "that there is neither majority nor minority group domination, and that one political party
cannot impose its will on the whole country."' 97 Under a canton
system the central government would have strictly limited power
192.

Mojekwu, International Human Rights: The African Perspective, in
ISSUES 93 (1980).
Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at XXIV.
Smith, Apartheid With a Smiling Face, TIME, Feb. 10, 1986, at 60.
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193.
194.

195. Louw & KENDALL, supra note 19, at 71.
196. For a detailed outline of the proposed canton system, see LouW & KENDALL,
supra note 19, at 121-156.
197. Id. p. 126.
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and it would serve as an agent for the protection of cantons and
the basic rights of the citizenry."'
A second proposal for structural reform, as advocated by
Chief Buthelezi, is that of regional power sharing. 99 Chief
Buthelezi contends that, "[rneal change will not ultimately be
successfully imposed from on high. Real change will work
upwards as the Government works downwards. Both the upward
movement and the downward movement factors of change are
vital.

2 00

Consequently, in the Kwazulu-Natal province, negotia-

tion is underway to establish a regional multi-racial legislature
elected on a proportional one-man-one-vote basis.201 Proponents
of power sharing contend that if multi-racial regional government can be successfully established in the Kwazulu-Natal region it will act as a powerful incentive for a deracialization of the
rest of the country.20
A final structural reform which warrants mentioning is that
of cooperative decision making between groups in a complex democracy. 2 3 This model rejects the notion of western democracy
on the theory that it results in "winner takes all" and thus,
would lead to domination by one group over others.204 To pro-

tect minority rights, this model would ensure guaranteed representation in the legislative structure of the country for each
group and each group would participate on an equal footing with
every other group regardless of size.20 Proponents of this system
contend that any degree of simplification, such as the western
concept of democracy, would be a step away from democracy towards authoritarian rule.2 6
To facilitate the process of structural reform, whatever form
198.
199.

Id. p. 147.
See generally, Buthelezi, The Reconciliation of Black and White Interests in
South Africa - A Proposed Agenda 166-177, in SOUTH AFRICA - THE ROAD AHEAD (G.
Jacobs ed. 1986).
200. Buthelezi, supra note 160, at 4.
201. Buthelezi, supra note 199, at 175. This effort is known as the Kwazulu-Natal
Indaba. See Bill of Rights of KwaZulu-Natal (adopted July 10, 1986) (Available at P.O.
Box 2925, Durban 4000, Republic of South Africa).
202. Buthelezi, supra note 199, at 176.
203. See Von Der Merwe, Reflections On A Political Future, in SOUTH AFRICA-THE
ROAD AHEAD,

supra note 199, at 140-158.

204. Id. at 154.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 158.
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it may take, the government can ease tensions by undertaking
social reform. One meaningful reform would be to release black
political prisoners.2 07 Another might be the release of former
ANC leader Nelson Mandela 2'0 By releasing Mandela, Botha
would appease many foreign critics and avert the martyrdom
that would result were the aging Mandela to die in prison.2 9 In
conjunction with this, Botha should charge or release the
thousands of detainees that have been confined since the imposition of the state of emergency.2 0 Ultimately, for reform to be
effective, blacks in South Africa must be able to look to the legal
system as a forum to protect their rights, not abuse them.2 1 '
And finally, the South African Government must provide
support for the black leaders that advocate peaceful change.2 1 2
While radicals tend to portray these individuals as "collaborators," the government should try to establish them as effective
black leaders. By repealing many of the "petty" apartheid laws
that are so demeaning the government could restore respect for
the system of law and the people who are willing to work within
it.
CONCLUSION

If the desired foreign policy end is to force reform without
jeopardizing other vital interests,2 13 the means should not be
made subservient to domestic moral fervor. The U.S. needs to
support factions in South Africa favoring peaceful reform,21' and
not adopt a policy which will polarize opposition. Ultimately, the
solution to the South African crisis must emerge from within.2 1
This is not to say that the U.S. cannot play a leading role in
207. "All the most influential leaders of the African people are today in jail - the
leaders who might be expected, by education and experience, to form a parliamentary
partnership with the whites in a democratic transition. JOYCE, THE NEW POLITICS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 119 (1978).
208. Playing the Mandela Card, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 1986, at 36.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 38.
211.
See generally, JACKSON, supra note 32; International Commission Of Jurists,
South Africa and the Rule of Law (1960).
212. Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at 439.
213. Crocker, South Africa: Strategy For Change, 58. Foreign Aff. 324 (1980).
Crocker, South Africa: Strategy For Change, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 324 (1980).
214. Policy Comm. Report, supra note 15, at XXI.
215. Id.
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easing tensions and providing support, but in the process, South
Africa's sovereignty cannot be compromised. Toward this end,
strictly limited sanctions, such as those employed under Executive Order 12532, while generally ineffective as a coercive mea-

sure,2 16 do send an affirmative statement of condemnation without imposing the negative side-effect of indiscriminate economic
deprivation. Accordingly, while brandishing the threat of a stick,
the U.S. should not be adverse to offering the benefits of a carrot
when constructive steps are taken.211 Such a policy, within realistic means limits, will promote legitimate human rights ends
and foster the economic growth that will dismantle apartheid.
R. Blair Thomas

216. Green, supra note 152, at 81.
217. Cotter, South Africa: What Is To Be Done, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 274 (1980). See
also, Hanks, supra note 163, at 67.
While it may seem a difference of semantics rather than substance, it is nonetheless true that the carrot generally works better than the stick. That is to say, if
those Western nations, which have been exerting intense pressure on the Republic of South Africa to change domestic laws and regulations, would let it be
known in Pretoria that the current efforts toward reform are understood and
applauded and that further advances will generate commensurate changes in
Western attitudes toward the Republic, the interests of all concerned would be
better served.
Id. at 67.

